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Social Accountability in Big Cities: Strategies and Institutions in  
Delhi and São Paulo 
Peter P. Houtzager, Arnab K. Acharya, Julia Amancio, Aheli Chowdhury, 
Monika Dowbor and Suchi Pande 
 
Summary 
There are signs that public services can improve in big cities when the urban poor hold 
providers directly accountable – what we now call social accountability. We do not know, 
however, to what extent the urban poor, through their civil society groups, engage in forms of 
social accountability nor what strategies they use. We do not know what factors lead the poor 
to choose accountability as a way to secure access to essential services, rather than 
clientelism, electing representatives to public office or simply self-provisioning. We need to 
answer these questions in order to develop programmes that support accountability 
initiatives and understand the potential social accountability has to improve the basic public 
services.  
 
We designed a unique comparative study to take a step in this direction. The study compares 
activism by the urban poor to improve two essential types of services in the cities of Delhi 
and São Paulo, primary healthcare and social assistance. The unusual comparison between 
a South Asian and Latin American city, and across two very different types of services, gives 
us greater capacity to sort through different possible causes of accountability activism by the 
urban poor and explanations for the different types of strategies people use.   
 
In the two cities, we find, a substantial share of civil society groups attempt to improve health 
and welfare services by holding providers accountable. They seek to establish greater 
accountability as one of several types of engagement strategies with the state – that is, 
accountability is a part of a larger repertoire of activism. There is large variation, however, in 
the level of activity and type of strategies in the two cities, and across the two services.  
Surprisingly, accountability activism is most robust in health in São Paulo and welfare (Public 
Distribution System, PDS) in Delhi; and least in welfare (Family Minimum Income Guarantee) 
in São Paulo and health in Delhi. Understanding the sources of this variation is one of the 
challenges of our paper. We look at whether the type of organisation and sources of funding 
influence accountability activity, and whether it matters whether civil society groups are local 
or translocal, or active in several areas of the city. We look at whether the type of service, or 
how services are provided, shapes activism. And we explore whether institutional factors, 
such as the right to information legislation in India and participatory governance councils in 
Brazil, which create different kinds of incentives or opportunities for civil society actors, 
impact levels of activity and what strategies are adopted. 
 
Keywords:  social accountability; primary health care; Public Distribution System; Renda 
Mínima; minimum income programme; civil society; urban poor. 
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1 Introduction 
To what extent do the urban poor in large cities attempt to improve public services by holding 
providers directly accountable? And how to they combine different aspects of such forms of 
social accountability – that is, creating common standards against which to measure 
performance, monitoring services, requesting information on budgets and staffing levels, and 
pressuring service providers to do better? Research hereto has focused on the impact of 
particular accountability tools, such as community scorecards or public audits, on services.1 
While the jury is still out, there are signs that this form of accountability from below can be 
effective.  
 
As research on impact advances it becomes more urgent that we know more about social 
accountability efforts by the poor in large cities, where an ever-larger share of the world’s 
population lives. If we are to develop a stronger framework for understanding when and 
where social accountability can improve public services, how to scale-up so that impact is 
systemic, and the ways in which international development actors can foster and support 
such efforts, then we need to identify which types of civil society groups take on this 
challenge, and the strategies they pursue – what actions are most common, who do they 
target, and how does accountability activity sit alongside other types of efforts to improve 
services.2 In some contexts it’s entirely possible that the urban poor find it more effective to 
lobby city assemblies or support the election of committed political leaders, or rely on 
clientelist relations, rather than direct action focused on providers. They may have given up 
on the state altogether for some public services and begun to self-provision services such as 
security through neighbourhood watches.  
 
In this paper we try to provide both a rich descriptive portrait of civil society accountability 
efforts and a view into the main casual factors that lie behind which groups take up this 
challenge and the strategies they pursue. Given the tremendous differences in civil societies 
across the world and the many dimensions of social accountability – shared standard against 
which to measure services, information about performance, justification of official decision-
making, and compliance with accepted standards – we chose an unusual comparative 
approach. We decided to compare, in as rigorously a way as possible, civil society groups 
engaged in accountability of providers in two very different large urban centres, Delhi and 
São Paulo. We then decided to deepen the comparison by looking at two distinct types of 
services: primary healthcare and welfare benefits (cash transfers in São Paulo and the Public 
Distribution System – PDS – in Delhi). Common patterns and trends we find in the two cities 
and/or sectors, despite their great differences, we believe, provide the bases for 
generalisation. The resulting four-way comparison is meant to help us sort through possible 
causal factors that can explain the levels and forms of social accountability we find. The 
differences across city and service help filter causal factors such as the type and/or funding 
sources of civil society organisations, the nature of the service and how it is delivered, the 
local or translocal nature of activism, and the broader institutional setting of accountability 
activism.  
 
                                                 
1  Farzana and Iversen 2014, Banerjee et al. 2010; Bjorkman and Svensson 2009; Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Gaventa 
and McGee 2010; Mansuri and Rao 2013; O’Neil et al. 2007; Olken 2007. Cf. Joshi and Houtzager 2012.   
2  Such collective efforts to hold providers accountability contrast to new public management (NPM) inspired efforts to 
make individual citizens agents of accountability by providing mechanisms such as easy to use complaint procedures 
and citizen charters, NPM-inspired policies bet that the accumulation of individual pinpricks (complaints) will trigger 
administrative accountability mechanisms, in particular sanction of managers and front-line workers. Social 
accountability acknowledges the power disparities between poor individuals and public officials, and the poor and non-
government service providers, in most social contexts. Cf. Schedler (1999); Mainwaring (2003); Fox (2007; 2015); 
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006). 
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The paper makes a particular effort to explore social accountability in the context of the multi-
dimensional web of relations civil society groups have to each other, to the providers and to 
the state agencies with responsibility for overseeing delivery of services. Groups that engage 
in accountability efforts have relationships with many other organisations and may engage in 
many other kinds of activities, such that any single act of social accountability must be 
understood as part of a broader set of interactions. The actors engaged in social 
accountability activities in particular are also likely to be engaged in many other kinds of 
strategies to interact with the state and its service providers.  
 
What we find is that civil society groups of the urban poor in Delhi and São Paulo are 
investing heavily in accountability activities. We also find that accountability activity is not 
ring-fenced from other efforts to improve public services but often is part of multi-scalar 
strategies by civil society actors that engaged with front-line providers, as well as with state 
agencies at the city and even federal levels.3 But actors in the two cities pursue strategies 
that differ substantially. There is also significant variation in accountability activity between 
the types of services we examine. In both cities civil society groups monitor, publicise, and 
pressure public officials and providers to improve coverage and quality in public services. In 
Delhi, however, we find that groups are more likely to monitor service providers, use the right 
to information, and bring administrative cases to pressure for better performance. In contrast, 
in São Paulo they combined the use of formal participatory institutions (e.g. health councils) 
and public contention such as protests and petitions to inflict reputational costs on providers 
and officials.  
 
What causal factors explain the varying levels of accountability activity we find, which groups 
engage in accountability and what strategies do they adopt? Some of the usual suspects 
appear not to matter. The type of organisation or sources of funding have little impact on 
levels or forms of activity. The type of service (universal such as health or targeted such as 
welfare benefits) and form of delivery (using public or private providers) may play some role 
but they matter less than the two main causes. First, groups that are part of translocal 
movements had higher and more robust levels of activity than organisations of the urban 
poor that worked exclusively in one locality.4 Such translocal actors are part of the legacy of 
larger social movements – the right to information and right to food in Delhi and the popular 
health movement in São Paulo that brought urban poor and middle-class professionals in 
broad alliances across the city. Such movements also played a critical role in the creation of 
a favourable or enabling environment for accountability action – the right to information (RTI) 
(Delhi) and participatory councils (São Paulo). The lesson for both theory and practice is that 
localism, and isolation of local actors in particular, reduces rather than increases 
accountability activity. Conversely, translocalism and involvement in broader civil society 
movements increases activity. Second, the broader institutional setting within which activism 
occurs, such as the right to information legislation in India and participatory governance 
councils in Brazil, have a substantial impact on accountability strategies. Such institutional 
arrangements create different kinds of opportunities for civil society and help steer on what 
dimensions of accountability actors will focus and what strategies they pursue. In the case of 
Delhi and São Paulo, the institutional arrangements that had a particularly strong influence 
on accountability efforts are themselves the legacy of earlier civil society activism. 
 
                                                 
3  Skocpol (1992); Evans (1996). 
4  The greater capacity for action, existing literature suggests, is likely the result from access to level of resources, skills, 
and influential social networks that more isolated local actors cannot achieve. Much of the work on social accountability, 
while concerned with elite capture of local associations, takes as a given that exclusively local actors are closer to, and 
more authentic representatives of, low-income communities. Larger (translocal) movements are seen as external actors 
with weak ties to local communities, and likely to distort and compromise the interests of these. Historically, however, 
some of the most influential social actors have been broad movements with local chapters or branches that reach deep 
into communities —the Movement of the Landless in Brazil, labor movements and peasant federations across regions 
of the globe, and important parts of U.S. civil society. Skocpol (2003), Fox (2007).   
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Our study surveyed local civil society leaders in approximately 40 localities in each of the two 
cities. We did not have an a priori focus on a particular type of local group or specific 
accountability instruments, common in impact studies. Instead, the research relied on a 
framework of broad types of accountability activity that we might encounter, types of 
institutional arenas in which this activity might take place, and different types of actors that 
might be targeted – service providers, private organisations that manage public sector 
providers, state agencies at different levels of government, elected officials, and others. The 
localities we selected are defined by the catchment areas of local healthcare centres, as 
these are small administrative units for which maps and other data is available. This 
purposeful sampling is meant to raise the best-case scenario, where the eco-system of civil 
society is rich/dense and accountability activity is likely, and control for explanatory factors 
common in the literature. We added to these sample areas that were similar where we 
searched for presence of civil society activity.  
 
The paper starts by introducing a more relational approach to understanding social 
accountability. It places civil society actors’ strategic decision-making about whether and how 
to engage in accountability in the context of a broader set of relations to the state and 
political institutions. It then presents the empirical foundations of the study, and describes the 
local civil society organisations that engage in accountability activity in the two cities. It 
characterises their activities and the institutional spheres in which these are pursued. Finally 
we offer an explanation for the variation we find in types of actors and activities between the 
cities and sectors and what lessons these hold for both policy and research. 
 
 
2  A more relational approach to civil society 
accountability activity 
 
Social accountability in our view is a type of relationship between citizen groups and the 
actors responsible for providing services.5 These actors include both the front-line private or 
public service providers, and the state agencies with broad responsibility for public services.  
A more relational approach to social accountability places social accountability in a context of 
a broader and ongoing set of ties, which can include but usually extend well beyond 
accountability. Civil society groups, providers, and public authorities, as earlier state-society 
synergy approaches suggest, adjust to each other over successive encounters, in different 
institutional settings.6 What types of activity citizen groups are willing and able to take 
depends in part on what capabilities they and their government developed in previous 
encounters, and what (if any) institutions emerged from these encounters. 
 
The state is increasingly only one of an array of legitimate actors who exercise public 
authority and shape services. Most thinking on social accountability focuses on action that 
targets state providers.7 This, however, is too narrow a focus with the growing fragmentation 
of the state through decentralisation, contracting out and privatisation, public/private 
partnership and providers of public services that are non-state actors.8 We do not know how 
these changes affect the ability of the poor to hold providers accountable for service delivery.   
 
                                                 
5  Accountability activity is not the same as social accountability, in the same way that democratic activity, such as voting, 
is not the same as democracy, a particular outcome or state of affairs. Our ambitions in this paper are therefore limited. 
We focus on accountability activity, not whether there is a state of affairs or process we could call social accountability. 
6   Evans (1996). 
7  Ackerman (2005), Malena, Forster and Singh (2004); and O’Neil et al. (2007). 
8  Dowbor and Houtzager (2014); Scott (2000). 
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Activity that aims to increase social accountability is that undertaken by civil society groups 
such as neighbourhood or community associations, social movements, or NGOs, to hold 
providers and state agencies directly accountable for public services.9 The core strategy of 
social accountability is to make public state failures in meeting existing legal obligations. Its 
power to improve services comes from the ability to impose reputational costs on providers 
and public officials, or to trigger other (classic) forms of accountability that have formal 
enforcement power.10 Publicity can trigger forms of what O’Donnell has called horizontal 
accountability, by other state institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, independent or 
quasi-independent regulatory bodies, such as the public prosecutors (Ministerio Público) in 
Brazil and public interest litigation in India.11 
 
A more relational approach to social accountability recognises that civil society groups 
pursue multiple goals and use a variety of strategies to improve the public services. Social 
accountability activities are almost always part of broader strategies that traverse multiple 
institutional or non-institutional public arenas, and take place at multiple levels of 
government. Our approach therefore starts with the idea that whether local actors attempt to 
build social accountability into their relations with providers and state agencies depends on a 
willingness to divert resources from other activities that have potential for success. Whether 
collective actors veer towards heightening social accountability action depends on how 
committed they are to other strategies, such as policy advocacy, co-production of services, 
or even campaigning for new policies or programmes. Social accountability activity, for 
example, might be difficult if collective actors are engaged in other forms of engagement with 
the state (e.g. holding contracts for service provision). Alternatively, other forms of 
engagement might give them a strategic advantage, with privileged access to information 
and policy makers. Local groups in Latin America and South Asia’s urban centres may 
attempt to influence several moments of the policy process, for example by lobbying 
legislative bodies or engaging in media campaigns. At the same time, they may also use 
local participatory institutions or informal governance institutions to hold public sector 
managers or providers accountable for full execution of the very policies they seek to modify 
through their lobbying campaign. 
 
Civil society groups combine specific accountability activities in different ways, at different 
points in time. These strategies evolve and change over time but include some combination 
of gathering information on public services, insisting on public justification on how these have 
been allocated, and public sanction where these fall short.12 It is the ongoing and more 
precisely targeted nature of social accountability that can make it a more effective tool than 
‘throwing the rascals out’ in periodic elections. Elections, Manin, Przeworski and Stokes also 
note, are often a vote on the future, rather than a holding to account for past performance.13 
And Jalal observes further that accountability activity ‘catalyses on demand as and when the 
situation requires.’14 
                                                 
9  Social accountability, we should be clear, is different from such individual problem-solving, as well as from social 
movement demands for new positive rights or services. Instead, social accountability focuses on collective efforts to 
gain access to services that are legal entitlements 
10  Scholars such as Mainwaring (2003) and Olken (2007) argue that social accountability has limited potential to improve 
public services because, in contrast to political or administrative forms of accountability, it cannot impose formal 
sanctions and force compliance.  Civil society groups, for example, cannot levy fines, remove officials from public office, 
or cut agency budgets. But by making state failure public these groups create nontrivial reputational and political costs, 
and thereby threaten loss of public standing and political support, and possibly removal from office, cuts in budgets, or 
even loss of contracts. The reputational strategy, Schedler (1999:16) points out, is not restricted to civil society activism. 
‘In the world of politics, the destruction of reputation through public exposure represents one of the main [means to 
achieve] accountability.’  
11  O’Donnell (1998). 
12  Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006). 
13  Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999). This, of course, does not preclude the fact that clear evidence of under-
performance or corrupt practices cannot play a role in election results even in poor communities as we find in Banerjee, 
Kumar, Pande and Su (2011). 
14  Jalal (2008):106. 
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Creating institutionalisation of mechanisms for social accountability over the medium to long 
run is often one of the goals of social accountability action. Sometimes this succeeds, such 
as in the case of the social audits in India (which emerged from informal public hearings) that 
have been incorporated into the national rural employment guarantee law (NREGA), after 
much pressure from the National Campaign for the Right to Information.15 
 
 
3  Many dimensions of social accountability 
 
Preliminary research in São Paulo and Delhi showed that civil society groups use a diversity 
of accountability strategies and, therefore, that we need to think more carefully about the 
different dimensions of social accountability. If there is no monitoring or if there is no public 
shaming, can we still have social accountability? Does reliance on informal accountability 
mechanisms such as those in professional, political party or other social networks constitute 
social accountability?   
 
We are inclined to believe that engagement in accountability is an inventory of activities that 
have overlapping characteristics much like family resemblance. Different components have 
different costs to local actors and different impacts on service delivery. Such activity — 
making demands through regular formal channels, demonstrating or engaging in contention, 
collecting data on services provision, bringing legal or administrative cases — requires that 
local groups choose in which activities to invest and to consider the trade-offs.16 The variable 
costs might explain why in different contexts some forms of accountability activity prevail 
over others. 
 
It is therefore useful to disaggregate social accountability activity. A lot of the research 
conceives social accountability as including most forms of citizen participation, such as 
participation in policy-making or campaigning for new rights and services. While there is a 
connection between different types of citizen participation, social accountability has a distinct 
set of dynamics on service provision from other types of participation.17 In contrast to 
participation in deliberative processes, in which policy is negotiated and service delivery 
standards are set, accountability is a process of ensuring state power is used to achieve 
these policies and standards. If we want to understand how delivery of public services such 
as healthcare or education interacts with accountability activities, then we have to isolate 
these activities from other related actions, such as being engaged in deliberative processes 
that help shape legislation.  
 
Schedler makes the important point that the components of accountability do not all have to 
be present in equal measure.18 This raises the question, if some dimension(s) is entirely 
absent, can we still talk of social accountability? Breaking the idea of social accountability 
into different dimensions, as we do below, also leads to the critical question, how do these 
dimensions interact in practice, in different types of social accountability initiatives and 
different contexts? Can progress in one dimension undermine progress along another, or are 
they tightly linked and one depends on the other? 
 
Public accountability is a type of control over the exercise of power by public authorities, and 
over those to whom this authority has been delegated (such as private service providers). 
                                                 
15  Pande (2014). 
16  This is similar to what Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) observe in relation to forms of political participation, where 
the costs vary for voting, volunteering in electoral campaigns, and contributing money.  
17  Lavalle and Vera (2011). 
18  Schedler (1999: 17-18). 
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There is basic agreement on the ‘package’ of accountability relationships: i) an agreed 
standard of what government sets out to provide and how, against which performance can 
be assessed; ii) information about that performance – what is actually being provided; iii) 
justification of the decisions made by providers; and iv) demanding compliance with 
standards and sanctions.  
 
Clear and knowable standards of services provide the metric by which public officials and 
organisations can be held accountable.19 The services to which citizens are entitled, and how 
these should be provided, are generally set out in legislation, public policies, and 
administrative rules. But these can be ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Conflicts over 
what standards apply are a central dimension of accountability initiatives. Often entitlements 
to basic services are not widely known by recipients and that is why social accountability 
initiatives often include information campaigns that generate collective knowledge of what 
services residents ought to receive. National and international civil society organisations, as 
well as donors, can play an important role in accessing and making these standards public. 
 
Information on service delivery – what is actually being provided – such as budgets, number 
and location of points of delivery, staff size, and so forth, is the raw data of accountability 
initiatives. Are staffing levels in schools and health posts adequate? Are providers keeping to 
scheduled opening hours? Answering these types of front-line questions requires detailed 
information on what services are being delivered (and how). This information is usually 
obtained from a combination of accessing official records and direct monitoring of service 
provision.  
 
Demanding compliance and imposing sanctions seek to close the gap between what has 
been promised (standards) and delivered. Social accountability involves rendering judgment 
on the extent and nature of this gap. Communities may demand more doctors in a health 
post if it has not met the mandated ratio of doctors to the population served. This dimension 
of accountability has two separate components that can take place simultaneously. One is a 
demand for compliance. This demand is prior to any sanctions and gives state agencies 
opportunities to remedy the situation. If agencies do not make substantial progress towards 
narrowing the gap between promises and delivery, sanctions follow. Sanctions can create 
reputational costs, disrupt normal functioning of services, and trigger formal sanctions 
through administrative or political channels of accountability. Civil society groups may 
engage in contentious collective action and media campaigns to publicise the gap and name 
and shame poor providers, and simultaneously bring collective cases in administrative 
tribunals. These activities are on-going, rather than one-offs. 
 
 
4 Empirical foundations 
 
The study combined a non-random survey of local accountability actors in low-income areas 
of each city and detailed case studies of the evolution and institutional architecture of each of 
the health and welfare services. The case studies, which are not presented here but help in 
the interpretation of the data, included accounts of the role civil society activism had in 
shaping each of the services and the relevant institutions.   
 
In this paper we answer four basic questions about accountability activity in the two cities:  
(i) how pervasive are actors who engage in social accountability activities; (ii) are certain 
types of actors more likely to under-take such activities; (iii) what kind of activities do they 
undertake; and (iv) which institutional spheres are these actors most likely to use? Our 
                                                 
19  Schedler (1999: 14) and others address standards and public officials ‘rule-guided’ behaviour as background conditions, 
but these are the very basis of accountability and should be part of its explicit conceptualisation. 
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answers to these questions cannot be generalised to the entire city because the sample is 
not representative.  In the low-income regions of each city that we surveyed – that is, those 
with an average low household income or, in Delhi, a legally recognised slum area – we did 
find clear patterns. Given the sampling procedure we used, described below, we feel 
confident generalising these patterns to the cities low-income areas.  
 
There is little research comparing São Paulo and Delhi. It is in many ways an unusual 
comparison. They differ greatly in local civil society, in the administrative organisation of the 
city, and in city politics. While São Paulo is Brazil’s longstanding financial and industrial 
centre, Delhi has lost much of its manufacturing and is the centre of India’s politics – it is the 
national capital. These contrasts, however, allow us to use a ‘most different case’ design and 
identify underlying explanations for social accountability activity. Most importantly for us, the 
cities differ markedly on many factors that we believed might shape social accountability 
activity such as level of political competition, presence of private service delivery or 
participatory institutions. If we found similar types of actors, accountability activities, or other 
dynamics, these would jump out at us and indicate some basic element of social 
accountability. 
 
Conducting research on civil society is difficult, as organisations and the types of relations 
they have can be hard to identify. It requires a lot of contextual knowledge and researchers in 
the field who are well-versed with the areas explored. The cities of São Paulo and Delhi were 
also a good choice for us because of extensive previous research on citizen-state relations in 
both, and therefore deep quantitative and qualitative knowledge of low-income regions of 
each city, and an established network of researchers to work with.  
 
Because local accountability actors are a difficult population to survey, we decided to keep 
our sample small – between 40-45 micro-regions. We defined these regions by the only 
criteria for which data exists for the entire city – the catchment area of the local health post. 
These generally coincide with several neighbourhoods and it was possible to map electoral 
data (by voting district) onto these areas. The regions are relatively homogenous in terms of 
household income and levels of urban development and access to public services. For a 
small non-random sample, careful selection of the regions of each city and the services to 
compare plays a critical role in testing or controlling for different factors that might shape the 
presence of social accountability actors, the types of activities that are undertaken, and the 
institutional spheres that are used.  
 
A variety of factors might influence social accountability. Running through different 
literatures, from that on collective action to electoral politics and historical institutionalism, we 
came up with the following set of factors that influenced our case selection: 
 
1) Location — regions of the cities: 
 Level of urban development – greater urban infrastructure, such as presence of 
government offices, security, and transportation networks, can substantially 
lower the costs of accountability activity. 
 Political party competition – heightened competition, the literature suggests, 
would make local officials and party activists more responsive; dominance of 
governing party or coalition could give activists greater access to public officials 
and more favourable treatment. 
2) Nature of the service: 
 Primary healthcare is a private good but universal and used by all households, 
whereas social assistance is narrowly targeted at the very lowest income groups. 
Both differ from services such as policing, which are public goods. 
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 Institutional arrangements through which services are provided– 
centralised/decentralised management, delivery through private/public entities, 
or presence of participatory governance institutions to co-manage or regulate 
services.  
 
The surveys of the more local actors in the two cities took place in 2007. Our sampling in the 
two cities was meant to help identify the possible impact of level of urban development and 
party competition on local actors’ social accountability activity. We chose the Eastern and 
Southern zones of São Paulo and the East and Northeast of Delhi.20 We first chose a region 
that was low-income but had good urban infrastructure, reflecting an older settlement pattern, 
and a region that was more recently settled and with considerable less infrastructure, 
including the presence of government offices. Within each of these areas we selected micro-
regions that had (i) high electoral competition or (ii) were firmly in the hands of the governing 
party.  
 
It is likely that a substantial share of our sample of 40-plus catchment areas has local 
associations that actively seek to improve services in their communities, and might therefore 
engage in social accountability activity. We introduce some bias by selecting on health post 
catchment area; our strategy was to ask a number of activists who were engaged citywide 
which areas of the city they thought had the most active associations in local communities. 
Within the vast cityscapes of Delhi and São Paulo the recommendations of known activists 
did not entail (1) that the civil society groups were actually present or (2) when found that 
they engaged in accountability activities. By triangulating the lists we obtained, and then 
filtering these by the micro-region criteria (high-low development regions of the city, high 
political competition or governing party dominance) we came up with a list of around 15 
catchment areas in each city. We used matching techniques for urban development and 
electoral competition to ensure that these 35-plus areas matched the first 15 areas we 
selected.  
 
Primary care in São Paulo is provisioned by both publicly-managed health posts (roughly 60 
per cent) and privately-managed ones (about 40 per cent). A large share of primary 
healthcare is therefore in private hands. By law the entire health system had become more 
decentralised and, critically for us, had established a system of participatory governance that 
was meant to give citizens greater voice in service delivery.21 The city government’s Health 
Secretariat has five regional Supervisions that supervise 31 Health Coordinators. Each 
Coordinator was responsible for an area with approximately 300,000 people, including a 
range of healthcare units. 
 
In Delhi primary care is centralised in Directorate of Health Services (DHS) of Government 
NCT of Delhi, with 11 district offices responsible for managing publicly run health posts; there 
are also federally run targeted schemes for particular illnesses and groups and mandated 
reservations for the poor in private hospitals for receiving land concession. The schemes are 
intended to serve the eligible poor, some linking back to health posts and some more 
centrally operated. The poor also seek care from a large private sector operated by both 
qualified and unqualified providers. In contrast to São Paulo, there is no participatory system 
providing opportunity for citizen voice. Although some changes have been made since 2007 
in Indian health policy for the poor, not much has changed in Delhi as it has not participated 
in the recent major national initiatives to reach the poor.   
 
We selected social assistance, and specifically Delhi’s Public Distribution System (PDS) and 
São Paulo’s Renda Mínima (minimum income programme), because the nature of the good 
                                                 
20  In Delhi low-income areas were identified through location of legally recognised slum areas. In São Paulo we used 
average household income to identify these areas. 
21  Tatagiba (2004); Schattan and Pedroso (2002). 
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differed substantially from health, and the type of assistance differed from Delhi and São 
Paulo. PDS and Renda Mínima contrast in terms of the debate on how best to provide help 
to families rise out of poverty – by providing basic necessities or by providing cash. In 
addition, Renda Mínima is highly centralised, run by a special office within the municipal 
Secretariat for Social Development. Beneficiaries receive bankcards and withdraw their 
payments from bank cash machines, but otherwise have no direct contact with the banks. 
PDS is a federal programme that, in contrast to Renda Mínima, is delivered in a very 
decentralised way by hundredss of small (privately owned but government licensed) shops 
located across Delhi. It provides subsidised food grains (mainly rice and wheat), sugar, and 
cooking fuel (kerosene) in a fixed quantity to ration cardholders.  
 
4.1 The survey 
 
There are few surveys of the type we conducted, because identifying civil society is a 
complex and costly undertaking. Organisations are difficult to locate and much of their 
activity leaves no formal record. A part of the influence such organisations wield is based on 
informal relations and subtle forms of power (in contrast to direct lobbying of legislatures or 
campaign contributions).   
 
In the absence of reliable and detailed information on local civil society we developed a 
process for selecting interviewees – the community leaders most active in improving 
healthcare and social assistance delivery. This process is far from ideal, yet it generated 
valuable data and a reasonable basis for selecting interviewees. We relied on a set of key 
informants in area micro-regions to identify the community leaders, and their organisations, 
who were most active on health and social assistance issues. After a walk around to inspect 
a micro-region, we identified prominent local residents who could act as key informants. We 
then sat down and discussed local health and social assistance activism with a sub-set of 
these prominent individuals. Discussions covered partisan affiliation of community leaders, 
interpersonal disputes, type and age of their organisations, and inter-organisational 
competition. The informants were, in general, a shopkeeper, priest, police officer, health post 
director, and one community leader. In some cases we went back to city-level activists to 
help identify community leaders. We triangulated the resulting lists for each catchment. In 
some cases we were unable to identify any active associations or even activists.  
 
The selection of interviewee is, therefore, not based on a snowball sample. Community 
leaders in each region were selected independently of each other. 
 
The interview used a structured questionnaire, which was divided into three sections. The 
first gathered basic information about the interviewee (profession, education, age, and 
gender) and the organisation (budget, focus of activities, and representation in participatory 
institutions). The second part focused on social accountability activities in health and social 
services, and PDS and Renda Mínima specifically. We explored acquiring access to 
information by asking about community leaders’ efforts to obtain information such as 
budgets, levels, and quality of services being provided, from providers and other levels of the 
state; and making compliance demands to enforce legal standards that are not currently 
being met. For sanctions we asked first whether they had organised public protest, petitions, 
and other forms of public contention. We then asked whether they had invoked any formal 
grievance procedures, such as administrative complaint mechanisms, ombudsmen, or 
bringing legal cases against a provider or government department. 
 
The third part uses social network analysis questions to map organisations’ relations to other 
local civil society organisations working on neighbourhood and beyond. This section also 
asks ties to political leaders or public officials, social movements, and finally ‘Other’. All the 
questions asked interviewees to recall their activities over the past two years. 
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Our survey allows us to depict the associations we found and the breadth of accountability 
activities they undertake. It does not allow us to say how pervasive these activities are 
across the entire city.   
 
 
5  Civil society in low-income areas of São 
Paulo and Delhi 
 
The local civil society we examined in the two cities is worlds apart. The interviewees led a 
wide-range of associations in each of the cities but there are broad differences between the 
two. A majority of activists worked exclusively at the neighbourhood level (58 per cent) in 
São Paulo but only a third did so in Delhi. In the latter city more than half worked in the city at 
large or at a wider region of the city. The Delhi associations were considerably richer on 
average than their São Paulo counterparts. In the latter, half reported having no budget at all, 
about a third under US$6,000, and the remaining between US$6,000 and US$57,000. Only 
half the organisations in Delhi (16 of 32) were willing to report their budget but of those the 
average was $71,000 a year. 22 We know from secondary sources that the associations that 
did not report budgets tend to be among the more affluent and the largest budget we found 
was $185,000, more than three-times that of the best funded association in São Paulo. 
 
In the two cities almost half of the associations reported involvement in government 
programmes, albeit in different ways. In São Paulo they delivered social programmes, 
primarily the São Paulo state government’s milk distribution programme Viva Leite and the 
city government’s day-care and literacy (MOVA) programmes. In Delhi the most common 
were the identification of potential beneficiaries on behalf of federal social programmes—that 
is, people below the poverty line—and for tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS-related programmes.    
 
And whereas government was a substantial source of funds for associations in São Paulo, it 
was foreign donors who played this role in the case of health-care in Delhi. Forty-four per 
cent of associations (14 of 32) in Delhi reported funds from foreign donors and for nine this 
covered over half of their budgets.23 While half of Delhi’s associations said they worked on 
government programmes, only 16 per cent reported receiving government funding. The 
discrepancy is made up by the foreign donors’ role in funding many government programmes 
in low-income areas. No associations reported foreign funding in São Paulo but the ten with 
the largest budgets drew most of their money from government. Contrary to expectations, 
funding by religious groups was immaterial in both cities.24  
 
Overall, the leaders of local associations in São Paulo were older and had less formal 
education than their younger and better educated Delhi counterparts. If the Latin American 
city’s leaders were largely middle aged (60 per cent were 50 years or older, and 25 per cent 
were in their 40s) and almost half had education below the secondary level, the South Asian 
leaders averaged 43 years and almost half of them had some post-graduate education (only 
15 per cent had less than secondary education).25 Only the gender balance was close in the 
two cities, with women representing 40 and 30 per cent of leaders in São Paulo and Delhi 
respectively. 
                                                 
22  Exchange rate in 2008 were for Brazil R$1 = US$0.567 and for India INR1 = US$0.024. 
23  Donor funding was especially prominent among richer organisations; ten organisations reported having a budget of 
more than US$71,000 (3.1 million INR) of which eight received donor contribution.  
24  One association in each city drew most of its budget from a religious institution but the others received no such funding 
(with one exception in Delhi). 
25  In São Paulo 40 per cent had completed secondary school, 12 per cent were professionals in health or social services, 
and 20 per cent were industrial workers. 
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Surprisingly then, the São Paulo leaders were active in a larger number of associations, 
movements and participatory spaces than the Delhi leaders. Almost half participated in five 
or more (in addition to their own), and 70 per cent were active in the city’s participatory health 
councils (a formal institution with government representation). Delhi has no comparable 
system of participatory councils but these aside, most activists and NGO leaders participated 
in roughly two or three associations, movements or campaigns.   
 
Table 5.1 summarises the study’s fieldwork by city. Collective actors were more prevalent 
and a greater proportion took part in social accountability activities in the Brazilian city. In 
both cities all actors engaged in social accountability activities took part in activities centred 
on health; a fewer number were active in both types of services.  
 
Table 5.1 Fieldwork in São Paulo and Delhi 
 
 Delhi São Paulo 
Sites Visited 40 45 
Civil Society Actors Identified 32 42 
Number engaged in social accountability 28 42 
Number engaged in accountability of health and 
social services  
16 23 
 
Most actors were neighbourhood specific organisations; a share acted within a city region 
and some also had citywide links; the latter two groups we call translocal. In both cities the 
translocal actors were more active than those who worked in single neighbourhoods.  
 
In São Paulo, 86 per cent of the 16 actors with a regional base met with communities, and  
77 per cent of the neighbourhood specific organisations did. For social assistance numbers 
are far lower, 44 and 22 per cent. Similar observations hold for Delhi as well. For health, from 
those we could identify as neighbourhood-base actors, 63 per cent of the 11 actors met with 
communities on health issues while for the translocal actors it was 75 per cent of the 16 
actors. For social assistance there were very few organisations that could be seen as only 
neighbourhood actors; we identified only 2 of the 4 neighbourhood specific actors 
participated with community activities. For the translocal actors, community meetings seem 
to be a norm: 83 per cent of the 12 actors held community meetings.  
 
5.1 Social accountability by city and service 
 
Social accountability of the local health post and social assistance programmes by local 
actors in Delhi and São Paulo is widespread. Even in the poorest and most vulnerable 
regions we selected communities engaged with the providers of health and social assistance, 
PDS and RM, to improve services. Figure 5.1 shows such activity in 70 and 93 per cent of 
catchment areas we surveyed in Delhi and São Paulo respectively. The figure puts Table 5.1 
into percentage terms to tell us how widespread accountability activity was across regions of 
the city. It does not portray the extent of social accountability activity in each region, which in 
some instances was high and in others low. It tells us, however, that large segments of the 
urban poor are able, and have sought, to establish some degree of accountability over  
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service provision. We show later that the most pervasive form of activity among all collective 
actors engaged in social accountability was demand for better and/or more services (more 
than 90 per cent) in both cities. 
 
Accountability of the provision primary healthcare was more widespread than for social 
assistance in both cities, and we did not find any region where local actors engaged 
exclusively with providers of social assistance. Figure 5.1 shows that we found health 
accountability in 70 per cent of the Delhi regions we surveyed and 93 per cent in São Paulo, 
whereas 40 and 42 per cent of the regions has actors engaged with the provision of 
assistance.   
 
Coverage of social accountability appears to be related in part to the nature of the service 
being provided. The widespread activity around healthcare likely reflects that health needs 
are widespread and for more serious health issues people commonly seek treatment by 
medical professionals – doctors, nurses, dentists, and so forth – though reliance on quacks 
(unregistered medical practitioners) is common in Delhi. In addition, residents have easy 
access to health centres, which are located in all of the sample communities.  
 
Figure 5.1 Regions with social accountability in Delhi and São Paulo  
(percentage of regions) 
 
In contrast, the populations that are beneficiaries of PDS and Renda Mínima is far more 
restricted than for health and tend to be the poorest and most vulnerable. While all families in 
a community have health needs at one point in time or another, a smaller share will be 
enrolled in the social assistance programmes. In the case of social assistance, even serious 
needs tend to be ‘treated’ through social networks (family, neighbours and friends) and many 
needs will not be defined as requiring social assistance professionals. Furthermore, PDS is 
subcontracted to hundreds of small privately owned shops. The shops are small and serve 
only a small clientele. This creates a coordination problem for PDS beneficiaries, not least 
because the service problems will vary in nature and intensity by shop, and targeting many 
small shop owners simultaneously is difficult. The shops are also private and subject to 
different standards of public access and scrutiny, if not in law certainly in practice. Renda  
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Mínima has little administrative structure below the municipal administration (city hall), while 
the rest of social assistance in São Paulo is provided through a patchwork of not-for-profit 
organisations.   
 
The substantial levels of activism involving PDS and Renda Mínima in fact defy expectations. 
How is it that the poorest urban residents of these mega-cities are able to mobilise to hold 
fragmented and/or weakly present local providers to account? Irrespective of their relative 
success at improving services, this appears on the face of it no small accomplishment. There 
is no single explanation. In Delhi, specialised activist NGOs such as Parivatan, organised by 
middle-class activists, worked with local groups in informal settlements to combat corruption 
and abuses within the PDS. São Paulo’s neighbourhood associations, which address a wide 
range of community issues, have in a number of instances taken on social assistance 
activity. Renda Mínima is far from frictionless as various problems – lack of addresses for 
mailing bankcards, loss or demagnetisation of cards, changes or cancellation of benefits 
without notice – all result in beneficiaries calling on local leaders to demand information and 
better coverage. 
 
In roughly a third of the surveyed areas in Delhi we were unable to identify any local 
collective actors who engaged in accountability activity of either the local health post or the 
PDS shops. These areas were distributed relatively evenly across the regions of the city in 
which we worked. 
 
The difference in accountability activity between Delhi and São Paulo reflects the more 
common health activity in the Brazilian city. Why would there be a gap in accountability of 
health services between the two cities, especially when there is no such gap for social 
assistance? The gap is not an artifice of the sample, given that it used health catchment 
areas as the sampling unit and hence it is not the case that there are less health posts in the 
40 regions of Delhi than in São Paulo’s 45. One possible explanation for the gap is the high 
prevalence of neighbourhood and other community associations in São Paulo, and their 
capacity to engage with the health system. Moreover, features of the health system further 
facilitate civil society engagement – in particular, the presence of participatory governance 
councils that stretch from local health post, hospitals, region of the city, and the city itself. It is 
possible that accountability levels differ in health also because Brazil spends about 4.4 per 
cent of GDP in public funding on healthcare and India less than 1 per cent, one of the lowest 
in the world.26   
 
5.2 Social accountability activity 
 
Here we examine in which types of accountability activity collective actors invested. In 
practice several may occur simultaneously. In particular, public protests and petitions were 
used at various moments – to obtain access to public records, to force providers to sit down 
at the table to discuss shortcomings in provision, or to sanction.  
 
Local actors active in accountability of social services in the two cities were far more 
concerned with obtaining information about the provision of PDS and Renda Mínima than of 
primary healthcare (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). In Delhi 69 per cent of actors engaged in social 
accountability activity to improve social assistance sought information about PDS delivery, 
twice as much as those engaged in accountability of health centres. In São Paulo 64 per cent 
of actors involved in social assistance sought information about the delivery of Renda 
Mínima, while 48 per cent did for health. The information sought about PDS provision 
included documentation of storeowner’s allocation of PDS goods, registration of beneficiaries 
and how much supply they had received, and even opening hours. For Renda Mínima, along  
  
                                                 
26  Gragnolati, Lindelow, and Couttonlec (2013). 
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with other social services in Brazil, it included information about the benefits and 
requirements of the programme, the registration process, as well as explanations for 
changes in benefit size and termination.  
 
This gap between health and social assistance reflects in part the difference in the nature of 
health and social assistances as public services. PDS, Renda Mínima and social assistance 
programmes in general are targeted and some beneficiaries may only receive benefits 
temporarily, whereas health posts provide universal coverage. Information about who is 
entitled to services or benefits, and to some extent the nature of this entitlement, is less of a 
concern. This cannot be the whole story however. Accountability in health requires access to 
information about the type and level of service to which the community is entitled and about 
the actual levels of provision, including budgets, staff levels, and opening hours. And the 
similarity of information seeking activity for social assistance, despite the programmes being 
significantly different in the two cities, suggests that the nature of the public service 
influences the types of social accountability activity that is undertaken. 
 
Figure 5.2 Social accountability activity, Delhi (percentages of actors) 
 
 
In São Paulo, however, the actors engaged in social accountability have far greater access 
to information for health services than for assistance, because of the system of health 
participatory governance institutions. Accountability of health provision in São Paulo is 
greatly facilitated by the health post councils and other participatory bodies that make 
available/public information about both decision-making and performance of health service 
delivery. Of the four programmes we look at, only in São Paulo’s healthcare system do local 
actors face a relatively accessible and open state apparatus.  
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Figure 5.3 Social accountability activity, São Paulo (percentage of actors) 
 
 
The outlier in this case is accountability of healthcare in Delhi. Without easy access to 
information about service provision, but with the pervasive presence of health centres in the 
regions we surveyed, it is reasonable to expect high levels of activity to secure this type of 
information. Yet it has the lowest level of the four services. Furthermore, the most prominent 
type of activity was demand making. We believe that citizens of Delhi do not expect the 
public health system to be highly responsive. There are several reasons for this: (i) the 
perception that private health care is usually better fosters lack of demand for improving 
public care; (ii) multiple numbers of government schemes to address health issues; and (iii) 
the lack of resources for the public sector.27 Thus citizens in Delhi may care more about 
getting access to discounted private care through personal action. In addition, those needing 
special care such as for tuberculosis or HIV/AIDS may make demands on well-known federal 
schemes rather than the health posts, which are not equipped to handle these diseases.   
 
Furthermore, Delhi has not had a social movement that helped transform what is seen as a 
private issue into a major public issue, politicising the issue and mobilising citizens to 
demand better services.28 It also lacks fora that facilitate activism on health issues, such as a 
public system that oversees all basic care.  
 
Demanding that providers’ bridge the gap between the services promised by legislation and 
those actually provided is the most common accountability activity, across the two cities and 
in all of the four programmes we examined. It is the moment when providers can respond to 
local grievances and close the gap before being sanctioned. Over 90 per cent of the local 
actors made demands for better services, with the one exception of the social assistance 
programme Renda Mínima in São Paulo (80 per cent).  
 
                                                 
27  Cf. Das and Hammer (2007); La Forgia and Nagpal (2012). 
28  There is health care advocacy in Delhi, often as part of national campaigns, but it is sectoral: women and child health; 
nutrition; reproductive and child health; and so forth. There has been no high profile public campaign around universal 
healthcare. 
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Imposing sanctions by engaging in contentious action such as protests come at a relatively 
high cost to local groups, as it involves not only opportunity costs (lost days of work and 
family care) but also possible reprisals and repression. On the other hand, it capitalises on 
the resources such groups have available – numbers and the skills and local networks that 
make organising possible. Our findings for contentious sanctions differ sharply across the 
four cases but not in ways we might expect – that is, by city or by service. Contentious 
activity is the highest for accountability of primary healthcare in São Paulo and for social 
assistance (PDS) in Delhi. A surprising 78 per cent of the actors in São Paulo engaged in 
contention for healthcare, while only 42 per cent of actors involved in social assistance 
accountability did. In Delhi 69 per cent did for social assistance (PDS) and only 39 per cent 
for healthcare. Neither city nor service is therefore the common denominator for contentious 
sanctions. 
 
Contentious action is the hallmark of social movements and advocacy campaigns and in 
Delhi it appears to reflect the prominent role of the Parivatan cohort of organisations in PDS 
accountability and in São Paulo the popular health movement in healthcare accountability.  
These movements span many local communities, have strong middle-class allies, and a 
normative commitment to not only citizens’ access to public services but eliminating poverty 
and inequality more generally. The far lower levels in the cases of health in Delhi and RM in 
São Paulo reflect the absence of such more substantial collective actors and the more 
politicised social movement or campaign approach to accountability.   
 
Formally sanctioning providers through administrative and court cases, or by rallying 
ombudsman, is a far less used strategy by most of the accountability actors, with one 
startling exception. We would expect formal sanction to be relatively rare because of the 
specialised knowledge and high resource required, and given the slow turning of the wheels 
of justice. PDS is exceptional among the four cases with a high number of actors using 
administrative-legal procedures – 56 per cent. That is close to double that of health actors in 
Delhi and almost four times higher than the share of the highly active health actors in São 
Paulo.   
 
The PDS exception tells us something important about the importance of a relational 
approach. The high use of formal quasi-judicial procedures reflects in part the strategy of 
Delhi actors’ focus of making public official records of service delivery. The Delhi RTI law 
allows citizens to bring cases before the Public Grievance Commission, a formal and quasi-
judicial body, and argue that the disclosure of information related to PDS is in the public 
interest. The law has played a critical role in motivating large numbers of people to file 
applications.29 In addition, and as a last resort, activists could bring related complaints and 
grievances to the Right to Food Commissioners office. Parivatan and its cohort of activist 
NGOs are led by middle class activists with the needed skills and resources to navigate 
formal administrative and legal institutions. Local groups would have difficulty using these 
channels without the support of these city or region-wide actors. 
 
Only a very small share of São Paulo actors on healthcare have used formal administrative 
or legal procedures (14 per cent), and even less than for RM. This may seem surprising 
given the overall high levels of accountability activism in the city’s health services. We 
believe, however, that it points to, on the one hand, the conservative and inaccessible nature 
of the city’s judiciary and, on the other, the importance of its elaborate and legally mandated 
participatory governance structure. Local actors have ready and institutionalised access to 
local providers through the local health post’s governance council and to city government 
health officials through a legally mandated system of health councils, as well as civil society 
                                                 
29  The Commission by law can mandate that public officials and private providers, the shopkeepers, make public their 
records within a set timeframe -- 30 working days for regular applications and 48 hours for some cases where life or 
liberty is at stake.  In practice a lot depends on how Commissioners use their discretion and the state bureaucracy is 
becoming more adept at evading orders and denying information. 
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forums. Every community we surveyed has a local health council for its health post. This 
institutionalised access is far easier – i.e. less costly – to use and far more flexible and 
responsive than formal administrative or legal procedures.30 Such a well-developed 
participatory structure, and its civil society counterpart, does not exist for social assistance, 
which has only a single city-wide participatory governance council and civil society forum 
(dominated by providers). In the absence of institutionalised access to providers and policy 
makers, administrative and court cases are twice as likely in social assistance (in absolute 
numbers there are about as many actors using this form of sanction in health and 
assistance.) 
 
In both Delhi and São Paulo actors combined non-institutional collective action and 
engagement with institutional channels like the Public Grievances Commission and the 
participatory health council system. In Delhi for example, activists conducted surveys of 
residents ration cards, the records of shop owners, and official government documents to 
prove corruption. This evidence was corroborated by testimonies from residents at informal 
public hearings. Together these activities helped mobilised people to file RTI applications 
and support social audits.  
 
The movement literature is full of examples of actors simultaneously engaging in formal 
institutionalised and informal contentious processes. Labour movements engage in strike 
action to strengthen their position in collective bargaining. Advocacy groups organise large 
public demonstrations when legislative bodies are considering legislation that is crucial to 
their campaign. And Parivatan and the popular health movement, among others, organise 
protest events to put pressure on the parties involved in institutionalised dialogue or 
negotiations, as well as to get such negotiations started and to ensure subsequent 
implementation of agreements. In short, an important share of the power actors of the urban 
poor can exercise in institutionalised processes comes from what they do outside of those 
processes, such as inflicting reputational costs. Giving up contentious action, which takes 
advantage of the greater numbers and public support for the justness of their claims, is in 
effect giving up movements’ greatest source of power. 
 
5.3 Institutional spheres for social accountability 
 
Local accountability actors have a range of institutional spheres within which they can 
request information, make demands, and impose sanctions. These channels vary by city, as 
well as by public service. Our expectation at the start of the study was that local actors would 
use different institutional spheres depending on the city and service. We also expected that 
actors with strong local networks, and ties to city-level organisations, would engage with 
more institutional spheres.  
 
The leaders of the local actors we interviewed proved us wrong and right. The large majority 
said they focused their activities on government executive agencies – that is, public officials 
at different levels of government. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show that this holds true despite the 
different institutional spheres available in the two cities, as well as across the two types of 
services. It is all the more surprising given that private entities, for and not-for profit, play an 
important role in provisioning the services we looked at. Public officials in government 
agencies with legal responsibility for services, however, remain the single most common 
target of social accountability activity. 
 
In contrast, providers themselves – private or public – are less likely to be targeted (Figure 
5.4 and 5.5), although only slightly less in the case of primary healthcare in São Paulo. 
                                                 
30  The system of participatory health councils stretches from local provider units (health posts and hospitals), to the city, 
the state, and a national council. At each level except the provider unit, the councils are composed of representatives 
from civil society, government health officials, and providers. Councils of local health unit are made up of 
representatives of local civil society and the provider. 
24 
 
Delhi’s PDS is delivered entirely by small private shops licensed by the government, yet 94 
per cent of accountability actors in social services sought out the executive, while half 
targeted providers (Figure 5.5). In São Paulo the share of actors engaging directly with 
providers is high (84 per cent), though still lower than with government agencies (92 per 
cent). This may be because in the Brazilian city large religious entities such as Santa 
Marcelina and private hospitals manage many of the local health posts that we covered in 
our survey. These contractors are large entities and, while they are private, targeting them 
may have a larger pay-off than engaging with the multitude of small shopkeepers PDS actors 
face. 
 
Actors seeking greater accountability of services that are entirely provided by public sector 
providers – health centres in Delhi and Renda Mínima in São Paulo – were twice as likely to 
target government departments rather than the providers themselves – that is, local units 
delivering the services (Figure 5.5). 
 
The PDS shops are not only a small and disperse target, but they are run by lower-middle 
class shopkeepers who see their interest in protecting a small profit margin as being 
threatened by accountability efforts.31 In contrast, the state government agency responsible 
for PDS offers a larger target and it has jurisdiction over large numbers of shops. For local 
groups working with middle-class activist organisations such as Parivatan, the cost of 
engagement is therefore far lower and the potential impact far higher when engaging directly 
with government. In addition, there are sympathetic public officials who share their interest in 
reducing corruption and enhancing public accountability.32 This shared interest is far from 
widespread within the executive but it creates the possibility of better access to information 
about budgets, distribution of services, and who is making what decisions. 
 
Figure 5.4 Institutional channels used to engage in social accountability, São Paulo  
(per cent of actors)   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31  Pande (2008), Pande and Houtzager (2016). 
32  Pande (2008). 
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Figure 5.5 Institutional channels used to engage in social accountability, Delhi  
(per cent of actors) 
 
 
The accountability actors did confirm our hypothesis that institutional opportunities matter 
and shape what dimensions of accountability are pursued. In São Paulo those working to 
improve healthcare made extensive use of participatory governance institutions, an option of  
only limited value for Renda Mínima and not available in Delhi.33 The presence of the popular 
health movement among our interviewees helps explain this heavy use of the councils – the 
movement played a central role in the creation of the participatory council system in the 
1980s and 1990s. They represented 11 of 49 interviewees, however, only a quarter of the 
sample. It appears that other types of actors have seized on the opportunity the councils 
represent. They are readily accessible spheres for local civil society as the health posts 
councils in the community and civil society have legally guaranteed seats. The relatively 
high-level of access to the director of the health post (the provider) in São Paulo likely 
reflects that the relations established in the health unit’s councils are spilling over into other 
spheres. 
 
The PDS actors lack the participatory governance council option but instead have the 
institutional space created by the Right to Information Act. The use of the Right to 
Information Commission was discussed in the previous section, but to recap, all of the 16 
PDS actors filed right to information cases with the Commission. This option is not available 
in São Paulo.34 It is no surprise that the actors are all filing cases because actors such as 
Parivatan were part of a broad campaign to pass the RTI Act and which was designed in part 
to facilitate their access.  
 
                                                 
33  Renda Mínima has only three limited institutional spheres:  the Municipal Council for Social Assistance, city 
government’s Department for Social Development, six regional Social Assistance Reference Centres. The three 
spheres are distant from the urban poor: the reference centres cover upward of a million people each and do not have 
anyone responsible for Renda Mínima. The municipal council covers the entire metropolis and is dominated by service 
providers. Our analysis of its records show that over the years it has not played any role in relation to Renda Mínima. 
The councils that actors do engage with are likely those for the Rights of the Child and Adolescent and even Health, 
which are more likely to be responsive. Dowbor and Houtzager (2014). 
34  Filing right to information cases represents both a form of sanction, and the use of a particular institutional sphere – that 
of the Commission.  
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Actors in healthcare in São Paulo and PDS in Delhi were far more active than those in the 
other services, despite being very different services and the institutional spheres available for 
activism are sharply different. Virtually all of the health actors in São Paulo and the PDS 
ones in Delhi were active in two or more institutional spheres.35 In contrast, those involved in 
Renda Mínima and in Delhi’s primary care on average were active in only one sphere.36 The 
higher-level and diversity of accountability activity, in our view, reflects the regional 
(translocal) and social movement nature of the Brazilian health movement and India’s PDS 
actors. These two movements have played an important role in creating new legislation for 
their respective areas, protections for users, and institutional spheres for accountability (and 
other) activity. 
 
 
6  Some lessons 
 
The take away from these findings for policy and research on social accountability is that in 
large urban centres like São Paulo and Delhi there are substantial local actors with existing 
accountability relations. These actors pursue a variety of strategies to improve services, of 
which social accountability is only one. We need to develop a far richer and more nuanced 
understanding of these strategies and the relations to providers and state agencies on which 
they depend.  
 
There is a strong bias among international development actors to see local groups – those 
based in a single locality – as more authentic representatives of residents’ needs. This may 
or may not be the case, but our study suggests that translocal actors may be more 
embedded in local communities and engage in higher levels of accountability activity. 
Furthermore, associations that work in a single locality are also more likely to engage in 
service provision for government programmes or international donors. There is also research 
that suggests local efforts to distribute public resources are susceptible to elite capture; 
collective actors exclusive to local areas may be undermined by local elitism.37   
 
External actors such as large national, international NGOs, and the various bi- and multi-
lateral aid agencies need to calibrate their support for civil society, and for social 
accountability activity in particular, to reflect rather than disrupt the existing ecology of civil 
society actors in large urban centres and the strategies these actors pursue.   
 
External actors can play a critical role in social accountability. Our finding that translocal 
actors are more engaged in social accountability suggests that networking local actors to 
overcome barriers to accountability may foster the rise of such translocal actors. The most 
active agents of accountability are associations with a citywide or within city-regions (i.e. 
translocal) reach, rather than those working exclusively in one locality. The former group 
often enjoyed the support of middle class organisations, professional groups such as doctors 
or nurses, and sometimes that of sympathetic public officials. They can shift the local 
balance of power more in favour poorer residents in ways purely local actors find difficult. 
There is some evidence that such translocal actors have had greater success at increasing 
accountability and improving service delivery accountability. 
 
To understand and work with local actors, our study suggests, we need to understand the 
strategic choices they make about which relations to invest in to improve coverage of public 
                                                 
35  In Delhi all 16 use multiple channels (the 33 in health tend to use only one) – all but one target the executive, over half 
use providers and the legislature, and all use the RTI Commission. 
36  In health there is also little overlap between those who use the Executive and those who rely on Providers or the 
Legislature.  Less than half used the executive, and less than a quarter providers, legislature or other. 
37  Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005. 
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service. These choices are shaped through broad and ongoing relations such as those with 
government units, providers, legislative bodies, courts, and other civil society groups.  
Studies increasingly stress that context matters for how accountability tools work and 
interventions need to be adjusted to local conditions. The more relational approach we take 
in this paper helps to identify how existing relations and the institutional spheres in which 
they occur induce and constrain the choices of local actors. It shapes what dimensions of 
accountability they focus on, which specific activities they undertake, and with whom in 
government they engage. Institutional opportunities such as those provided by the 
participatory governance councils in São Paulo and the Right to Information Commission in 
Delhi have a significant influence on what types of accountability activities the actors 
undertake. 
 
These opportunity structures for accountability, over the medium term at least, are not static 
and herein lies an important opportunity for civil society support and interventions. 
Institutional spheres favourable to social accountability, such as the RTI and participatory 
governance councils, emerge out of previous engagements of civil society with government. 
For example, at the time of our survey, São Paulo’s health movement, neighbourhood 
associations, and other actors faced a health system that had a variety of institutional access 
points, including 500 health post councils, linked up to city, state, and federal health councils. 
These councils are the product of activism by the health movement in the late 1970s and 
1980s to expand health services and create a more transparent and accountable system. 
Many of its ideas and positions were incorporated into the 1988 Constitution, including 
articles calling for a universal and free access to healthcare (primary through tertiary) and 
citizen participation. In São Paulo the health movement was particularly strong, producing 
robust councils, and ultimately contributing to the rapid expansion of coverage of primary 
healthcare.38   
 
In Delhi PDS activists faced a favourable judiciary with a high degree of legitimacy and a 
right to information structure that was the product of earlier iterations of civil society 
engagement with the state. The relatively progressive nature of the judiciary dates back to 
the anti-colonial struggles, which culminated with independence in 1947. RTI emerged out of 
a national movement – National Campaign for the Right to Information39 – and actors such 
as Parivatan have brought critical issues related to targeting errors and corruption in the 
implementation of the PDS into the public domain through the use of RTI, along with media 
and other strategies.  
 
These experiences suggest that international support can contribute importantly to social 
accountability by supporting civil society campaigns and activities that are not, in any direct 
or obvious way, linked to social accountability. Supporting new legislation and public 
institutions for the provision of public services, or of their regulation, can create enabling 
environments for social accountability activity. Critically however, such support is more likely 
to foster accountability when it is delivered in the context of strong civil society campaigns. It 
is the presence of civil society movements that help forge legislation and institutions that well 
reflect local context and help ensure take-up in the medium-term. 
 
                                                 
38  Escorel (1998); Dowbor (2008). The institutional context of Renda Mínima was less favourable and reflects a different 
trajectory of civil society actors’ engagement with the state. Reformist social assistance professionals in the 1980s 
sought to expand coverage and composition of assistance services through their professional associations and 
networks. They did not attempt to build a broad movement to push for reforms. They were opposed by a powerful 
network of private non-profit social assistance providers, who saw their access to financial support from the State 
threatened by social workers’ efforts to replicate the health systems structure. While social assistance, like health, 
became a social right and duty of the state in the Constitution of 1988, the needed reforms stalled and by the mid-2000s 
social assistance still lacked a well-developed public infrastructure and a system of participatory councils. Houtzager 
and Lavalle (2010). 
39  Pande (2014). 
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Our data does not explore impact but other studies of PDS and primary health care in São 
Paulo suggest that accountability activity have extended and improved services and 
decreased corruption/fraud. There is compelling, if uneven, evidence that social 
accountability activities can improve public services for the poor.40 We know that, among the 
urban poor in cities like Delhi and São Paulo, there is an effective demand for such 
accountability. Here we have argued that how local and translocal actors can use 
accountability tools to inflict reputational costs on officials and providers, or to pressure 
power holders into triggering classic channels of accountability, depends on a series of 
broader relations with government and the institutions in which these unfold. This suggests 
that external actors and researchers can make a real contribution by supporting such actors 
and their efforts to create institutions that facilitate accountability.  
                                                 
40  Schattan and Pedroso (2002); Pande (2008). 
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